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Abstract 
Shanks et al. (2015) challenged the evidence that various forms of decision making can be 
influenced by romantic/mating primes. In their comment, Sundie, Beal, Neuberg, and Kenrick 
(in press) question both the meta-analysis and the 8 studies Shanks et al. reported, and 
describe an alternative p-curve analysis which they interpret as showing that romantic 
priming is a genuine phenomenon. In this reply we comment on several contradictions in 
Sundie et al.’s article. First, they suggest that Shanks et al.’s replication experiments yielded 
different results from the original studies because we failed to appreciate the contextual 
sensitivity of romantic priming effects, but this argument rests largely on evidence from the 
very studies we were unable to replicate, and a wealth of other evidence suggests that social 
priming effects are largely invariant across samples and settings. Secondly, Sundie et al. 
criticize the selection rule by which Shanks et al. identified relevant priming studies, but then 
go on to include exactly the same set of studies in their p-curve analysis. Thirdly, they 
criticize Shanks et al.’s selection of statistical results from these studies and propose a much 
wider selection, but then acknowledge that their selection process is poorly suited to 
assessing publication bias and p-hacking. Fourthly, we show that their p-curve analysis, far 
from demonstrating that this literature is unaffected by p-hacking, in fact shows the exact 
opposite. Sundie et al. claim that Shanks et al.’s priming manipulation was demonstrably 
weak, but their argument is based on a confusion between different dependent measures. 
We conclude that romantic priming remains unproven, and urge researchers in this field to 
undertake high-powered pre-registered replication studies. 
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Can various forms of decision making, including risk-taking and consumer choices, be 
influenced by romantic/mating primes? Shanks et al. (2015) questioned the published 
evidence on this issue and made two major proposals, that past research on romantic 
priming should be viewed with considerable caution because it showed strong evidence of 
publication bias and/or p-hacking, and that in any case several of the key findings could not 
be replicated. Meta-analyses and replication studies have cast doubts on the reproducibility 
of other forms of social priming such as ‘money’ (e.g., Lodder, Ong, Grasman, & Wicherts, in 
press) ‘flag’ (e.g., Klein et al. 2014), ‘intelligence’ (e.g., O'Donnell et al., 2018), and ‘religious’ 
priming (e.g., Billingsley, Gomes, & McCullough, 2018). Shanks et al.’s findings suggest that 
the reality of romantic/mating priming is equally doubtful. 
In their Comment, Sundie et al. (in press) argue that the conclusions of our article (Shanks et 
al., 2015) are flawed for a number of reasons. These criticisms are undermined, we argue, 
by a series of profound contradictions: 
(1) Sundie et al. point to a failure to appreciate the contextual sensitivity of romantic 
priming effects as a reason why Shanks et al.’s replication experiments failed to obtain 
evidence of romantic priming, but beyond being a speculation, this argument rests to a 
substantial degree on the very effects (e.g., gender effects) we were unable to 
replicate. Moreover we present statistical evidence showing that effects highly similar 
to romantic priming are not particularly sensitive to contextual variation. 
(2) Sundie et al. criticize us for failing to provide an adequate definition of the effect of 
interest and for “including a hodgepodge of variables that stretched the limits of what 
can and should be compared meta-analytically… Treating such disparate effects as 
belonging to a single distribution of the same effect calls into question whether any sort 
of meaningful interpretation is possible” (p. 8). Yet the identical set of studies formed 
the basis of their own p-curve analysis. 
(3) Sundie et al. take issue with the method by which we selected effects from the set 
of 15 studies we identified, and conclude that our assessment of publication bias or p-
hacking is therefore invalid. But after describing a meta-analysis based on a different 
selection rule – namely including all 144 available effects – they concede that 
“examining a funnel plot that includes all of the simple and main effects from a set of 
studies designed to examine interactions is poorly suited to providing any definitive 
information about publication bias or p-hacking in a literature.” 
(4) We critically evaluate Sundie et al.’s new p-curve analysis, demonstrating that it 
serves if anything to bolster the case for being extremely cautious about romantic 
priming. 
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In addition to highlighting these contradictions, we also point out a fallacious argument 
Sundie et al. make regarding the priming manipulation Shanks et al. employed. The claim 
that this manipulation was demonstrably weak rests on a confusion between different 
dependent measures. We end this Reply by making a proposal about how this field of 
research could profitably move forward in the future. 
Contextual sensitivity of priming effects 
If a given result is highly contextually sensitive, then there is a real risk that a replication will 
fail to recapitulate the precise context in which the effect was originally observed and fail to 
replicate it. Research on contextual sensitivity highlights time, location, culture and 
population as the major contextual variables (Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 
2016). Sundie et al. begin their Comment by arguing that any conclusions drawn from the 
meta-analysis and experiments Shanks et al. conducted must be weak because we failed to 
respect the contextual sensitivity of the research we evaluated.  
We do not dispute that romantic priming effects, if real, are likely to be sensitive to a range of 
factors, just like any other psychological measurements. But the case that Sundie et al. make 
for the supposed high contextual sensitivity of the original effects, beyond being a 
speculation, rests largely on the very evidence that is in dispute. Sundie et al.’s Table 1 lists 
interactions of gender (a contextual variable) with manipulations such as public versus 
private display, consumption versus benevolence decisions, and conspicuousness of the 
decision, for example, but these are all interactions we were unable to replicate. It is plainly 
circular to base a criticism of a failed replication on the very result that cannot be replicated. 
Is there any other concrete evidence regarding the contextual sensitivity of phenomena like 
romantic priming? Indeed there is, although not mentioned by Sundie et al. Several multi-lab 
replication projects have found that priming effects very similar to romantic priming are not 
especially contextually sensitive, at least in the sense that they do not vary systematically 
across different countries, cultures, languages, samples, and so on. As shown in Table 1 (to 
which we return later), in the multi-lab replication projects by Ebersole et al. (2016), Klein 
(2014), Klein et al. (in press), and O'Donnell et al. (2018), the degree of heterogeneity across 
laboratories for 7 types of priming, measured by the conventional statistics Q and I2, was 
small and only statistically significant in one case. For example, Klein (2014) found no 
heterogeneity in money priming across 36 laboratories in countries as diverse as Malaysia, 
Brazil, Turkey and the United States and across which the mean age of the tested participant 
samples varied from 18-35. The common appeal to hidden moderators as an explanation for 
replication failures is strongly challenged by these and related (e.g., Caruso, Shapira, & 
Landy, 2017) results, at least in the case of social priming. 
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A further contradiction is that Sundie et al.’s Table 1 lists other factors which are manipulated 
independent variables characterizing the stimuli or the type of decision being investigated, 
not contextual variables. For instance, manipulations of tactile versus visual or more versus 
less attractive stimuli, or of temporal versus physical length decision making measures, do 
not fall under the definition of contextual factors. 
This is not the only inconsistency in Sundie et al.’s claims about contextual sensitivity. They 
state, for instance, that “in many of the original research studies critiqued by Shanks et al., 
participants were pre-qualified as being heterosexual in orientation, before being asked to 
respond to manipulations designed only for heterosexuals (e.g., men asked to review dating 
profiles of attractive women). Shanks et al.’s replication studies had no such prequalification, 
and they retained substantial percentages of participants in their replication samples who 
had reported a non-heterosexual orientation. Moreover, whereas most participants in the 
original research papers were young undergraduate students, Shanks et al. recruited 
participants up to age 60.” 
Sexual orientation and age are certainly contextual variables (relating to the population 
studied), but the first part of this statement is a dubious claim: Participants were pre-qualified 
as heterosexual in only 8 of the 15 studies Shanks et al. evaluated. Nearly half (7/15) of the 
studies, including two in which Sundie et al. themselves participated (Griskevicius et al., 
2007; Sundie et al., 2011), made no reference to such pre-screening. In several of our 
experiments we did ask participants to report their sexual orientation. For example, in 
Experiments 7a and 7b, replicating experiments by Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, and Fischer 
(2013), only 12/235 participants (5.1%) self-identified as homosexual. Excluding them makes 
no difference to the results, as re-analysis of the dataset (https://osf.io/ytvj7/) reveals. 
Likewise, the age profile of our participant samples was nothing like as different from the 
original studies as Sundie et al. imply. The 120 participants in our Study 7a, for example, had 
a mean age of 21.7 years, very close to that in Greitemeyer’s experiment (mean = 20.3). In 
Experiments 7a and 7b, less than 10% of participants were older than 35. Again, excluding 
these participants does not alter the conclusions. Moreover, contrary to Sundie et al.’s 
speculation, age has very little effect on behavior. In Figure 1 we plot data from Experiment 8 
which was pre-registered with a total sample of 650 participants, endeavoring to replicate a 
study by Li, Kenrick, Griskevicius, and Neuberg (2012). From this sample we have extracted 
loss aversion scores for all 222 participants allocated to the romantic prime group and all 222 
participants allocated to the control group (for details of the experiment and the loss aversion 
score, see Shanks et al., 2015). It can clearly be seen that neither age nor gender moderates 
loss aversion scores, nor is there any suggestion that the difference between the prime and 
control groups is larger for young male participants. Priming is absent across the age range1. 
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In sum, the argument that our replication experiments should be discounted because we 
failed to recognize the contextual sensitivity of romantic priming effects is a weak one. 
Sundie et al. provide no evidence that romantic priming is any more contextually sensitive 
than any other psychological phenomena, and indeed the heterogeneity of similar priming 
effects is low. Their argument rests to a large extent on the very results that we were unable 
to replicate, and many of the factors listed in their Table 1 and described as contextual 
variables are actually manipulated independent variables. Moreover, nearly half the studies 
included in the meta-analysis reported no pre-screening for sexual orientation, and restricting 
our analyses on the basis of age and sexual orientation does not alter the conclusions. 
Specifying the effect of interest 
It goes without saying that an important aspect of meta-analysis is to specify with as much 
precision as possible what the effect of interest is. We described in some detail how we 
conducted our literature search for studies assessing the effects of mating primes, using a 
variety of different priming manipulations to activate mating/romantic motives/goals, on 
decision-making dependent variables. We highlighted the boundaries of this effect of 
interest, excluding for instance non-decision-making behaviors such as creativity and 
aggression. We defined our effect carefully, not least in terms of an explicit specification of 
the search terms we used to identify studies from a range of databases. 
Sundie et al. (in press) argue that our meta-analysis is in effect uninterpretable because our 
selection of effects to include was flawed and “stretched the limits of what can and should be 
compared meta-analytically” (p. 8). Yet they included precisely the same set of 15 studies in 
their own p-curve analysis (see below). If the effect was ill-defined for one form of meta-
analysis then it must be for other types too. Sundie et al. seem unaware of the contradiction 
between asserting that we should not have compared this set of studies meta-analytically 
while simultaneously conducting their own analysis on these same studies and drawing 
positive conclusions from it. 
It is curious that despite criticizing our specification of the effect of interest, Sundie et al. 
neither identify any additional studies that we failed to include in our meta-analysis nor any 
that were included inappropriately. If we “used a flawed procedure to identify and exclude 
effects…” (p. 4) then why have Sundie et al. not provided concrete evidence, in the form of 
examples, to bolster this claim? The fact that the included studies employed a range of 
different decision-making dependent variables is consistent with standard practice, provided 
that due heed is paid to the magnitude of observed heterogeneity. Just to give one example, 
the Hagger, Wood, Stiff, and Chatzisarantis (2010) meta-analysis of the ego depletion effect 
included measures of the control of attention, emotion, thoughts, impulses, cognitive 
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processing, choice and volition, and social processing, all employing distinct dependent 
variables.  
Regarding the effects we included, Sundie et al. say that “treating such disparate effects as 
belonging to a single distribution of the same effect calls into question whether any sort of 
meaningful interpretation is possible” (p. 8). But the measurement of heterogeneity in meta-
analysis (e.g., via the I2 statistic) is aimed precisely at determining whether a set of effects is 
too disparate to be analysed as a unitary set, or whether instead a moderation analysis 
needs to be conducted. If our selection of studies was so questionable, why was the 
observed heterogeneity so low (I2 = 19.6%)? (We return to this issue below when we 
comment on Sundie et al.’s own meta-analysis). 
Method for effect-size selection  
In our meta-analysis we endeavored to include all reported tests of the hypothesis that 
romantic or sexual primes would affect some target decision making behaviour. We did not 
select effect sizes depending on the observed results (whether they were significant or not) 
but instead depending on the predictions of the authors (whether they were predicted to be 
significant). 
As an example, Greitmeyer et al. (2013) gave participants in their experimental condition a 
priming task where they were asked to rate the attractiveness of opposite sex photos and to 
imagine and briefly write about a perfect date with one of the individuals. In the control 
condition participants rated different pictures (e.g., of streets). The effect of these primes on 
various risk-taking behaviors (e.g., sexual, gambling) was measured. 
In our meta-analysis we included the (significant) effects Greitmeyer et al. obtained for male 
participants but we excluded the (null) effects for female participants. The rationale was 
straightforward: Greitmeyer et al. predicted the former but not the latter: 
“It was predicted that the mating prime would have differential effects on women’s and 
men’s intentions to engage in risky sex: whereas a mating prime should increase 
men’s intentions to engage in risky sex (relative to a control prime), it should not affect 
women’s risk-taking.” (pp. 22-23). 
Why did we follow the standard practice of other recent meta-analyses of social priming 
effects (e.g., Lodder et al., in press) and select effects on the basis of the researcher’s 
predictions? The reason is clear: if this literature has been contaminated by publication 
bias/p-hacking, then that will only be detectable by looking at the primary outcome measures 
– that is, the effects that the researchers set out to test. It will not be detectable on secondary 
outcome measures (such as effects on females, or in males with high investment strategies) 
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because publication does not depend (or at least does not depend so strongly) on the results 
obtained with secondary measures. This in a nutshell is why our selection method paid heed 
to the researchers’ key experimental predictions. 
Sundie et al. (in press) argue (pp. 9-11) that our policy for including or excluding effects in 
our meta-analysis was arbitrary and applied inconsistently. In support of this charge, they 
offer the following example: 
Moreover, there was great inconsistency in how this “key experimental prediction” 
selection criteria was applied. For example, sometimes this operationalization was 
based on the hypotheses of the original study authors and sometimes based on the 
judgment of Shanks et al. (2015). Consider that Chan (2015, Experiment 1) predicted 
that a manipulation of romantic motivation using same-sex photos would influence risk-
taking, and this effect was included in Shanks et al.'s meta-analysis, but that Hill and 
Durante (2011, study 1) predicted an effect of romantic motivation on risk-taking using 
the same manipulation as Chan—and this effect was not included by Shanks et al. in 
their meta-analysis. In their supplement, Shanks et al. suggest that they did not include 
the effect from Hill and Durante because they were only interested in opposite-sex 
effects. (p. 9). 
Did we exclude the Hill and Durante result because we were only interested in opposite-sex 
effects (in which case, why include the Chan results)? Far from it. At no point did we state 
that our meta-analysis was restricted to opposite-sex effects (and this is not stated anywhere 
in our article or Supplemental materials, contrary to Sundie et al.’s assertion). So why was 
one of these effects included and the other excluded? Was it because we applied the 
selection rule inconsistently? The reason for excluding the Hill and Durante effect was, 
again, based on the authors’ theoretical perspective. Hill and Durante included both 
opposite- and same-sex conditions in their experiment and conceptualized the same-sex 
condition as constituting a ‘competition’ prime. The opposite-sex condition plainly provides a 
better estimate of the effect of mating/sexual primes on decision making, which was our 
focus. By contrast, Chan took a different theoretical perspective, regarding same-sex 
photographs as being mating primes: “when the average heterosexual man sees attractive 
males, he likely perceives himself to be less physically-attractive and less desirable as a 
mating partner to women. Compensatory theories in psychology suggest that this perceived 
lack should motivate him to increase his desirability as a mating partner to women” (Chan, 
2015, p. 408). Thus by the stated criterion, it was appropriate to include one of these effects 
but not the other (and of course note that excluding the Chan result makes a negligible 
difference to the asymmetry of the funnel plot). 
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Sundie et al. also claim that we “included a number of effects in [our] meta-analysis of “key 
experimental predictions” that were not even reported in the original articles… It seems 
doubtful that authors would fail to present tests of their “key experimental predictions” in their 
articles, and that editors would agree to publish such articles” (p. 10). In reality our selection 
procedure was anything but arbitrary, and we submit that any neutral person would choose 
the same effect sizes as we did if she was following our stated selection rules. 
To illustrate how wide of the mark this criticism is, in the context of trying to extract statistical 
results for a meta-analysis, consider one of the examples Sundie et al. give. In their study of 
priming effects on temporal discounting, Kim and Zauberman (2013, Study 4) say: 
Specifically, for delayed monetary rewards, participants in the hot condition 
demonstrated decreased happiness after the manipulation (Mbefore = 102.01 mm, SD = 
57.76 vs. Mafter = 84.83 mm, SD = 48.89), F(1, 52) = 4.74, p < .05, ω2 = .06, whereas 
happiness ratings in the control condition were the same before and after the 
manipulation (Mbefore = 105.49 mm, SD = 60.95 vs. Mafter = 109.35 mm, SD = 60.13), 
F(1, 52) = 0.50, p = .48, ω2 = 0. Supporting our hypothesis that sexual cues induce 
impatience by making delayed rewards seem even less attractive, we found that 
preference for delayed rewards decreased after the sexual-cue presentation, but 
immediate rewards did not become more attractive. (p. 333, underlining added). 
Although the design and analysis of the study is somewhat complex, it could hardly be 
clearer that they key result is the reduced happiness in the hot condition (which we 
calculated by comparing the Mafter ratings in the hot versus control condition), and to see its 
transparent link to Kim and Zauberman’s hypothesis (underlined).  
To conclude that an effect such as this could not have been the authors’ key experimental 
prediction because it was not reported in the original research paper is misleading. Kim and 
Zauberman chose to report statistical analyses comparing scores after versus before the 
manipulation whereas our meta-analysis required a comparison of scores after the 
manipulation in the experimental versus control groups, but this is a detail. Every datapoint 
included in the meta-analysis required some data transformation to derive an appropriate 
effect size. 
Sundie et al. go on to claim (p.11) that our ““key experimental prediction” inclusion criterion 
is… likely to produce the appearance of bias even if none exists” but this assertion rests on 
an incorrect characterization of our selection rule. They say: 
Suppose that an aspiring replicator was conducting a meta-analysis of a set of effects 
that, in truth, had no publication bias. Let us then suppose that the replicator decided 
on an inclusion criterion of only selecting effects that were positive and significantly 
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different from zero. Because this has the same effect as publication bias (i.e., both 
include only significant effects), it would yield an affirmative test for publication bias. 
Notably, the appearance of bias in this example is due entirely to the nature of the 
“only significant effects” inclusion criterion employed. (p. 11). 
In implying that this scenario applies to our meta-analysis, Sundie et al. are misrepresenting 
our selection rule. To be clear, the criterion we adopted did not require effects to be 
significant (indeed some were not, at the conventional p < .05 level), it required them to be 
key experimenter predictions, and there is no necessary reason why this criterion must yield 
a biased outcome. If a set of researchers independently conducted the same experiment in a 
Many Labs study, with the key experimental prediction being pre-registered, the ensuing 
results would be perfectly unbiased estimates. There would be no bias in selecting these 
effects for a meta-analysis. 
It is perhaps natural that Sundie et al. think we selected studies on the basis of statistical 
significance. If that indeed had been our decision rule, we would have ended up selecting 
effect sizes highly overlapping with the effect sizes that we did extract based on the authors’ 
predictions. This coincidence between the experimental predictions and the resulting 
statistically significant effects is exactly what is suspicious. 
Sundie et al. criticize our calculation of bias in our funnel plot (Shanks et al., Figure 2) on the 
basis that “if the true effect size were zero, and non-significant effects were suppressed due 
to publication bias or p-hacking, then publications capitalizing on these biases should just as 
often show negative effects as they do positive effects, resulting in a biased distribution on 
the left and right side of zero” (p. 13). The logic of this criticism is hard to follow. If a 
researcher, predicting on theoretical grounds that a romantic prime would make male 
participants more risk-seeking, instead obtained a statistically-significant result in the wrong 
direction, then this result would probably be just as likely to be consigned to a file drawer as 
a nonsignificant result. Publication bias and/or p-hacking are wholly consistent with the 
funnel plot asymmetry we observed. 
The Sundie et al. effect-size selection method 
Sundie et al.’s response to this supposed selection bias is to conduct an alternative meta-
analysis (Sundie et al., Figure 1) in which they apply no selection at all. They take every 
effect, even ones where the authors explicitly predicted a null result. Their meta-analysis 
includes, for instance, the effect for females (mentioned above) that Greitmeyer et al. 
explicitly predicted would be absent. But this approach radically changes the question the 
meta-analysis is seeking to address. Imagine that we’re interested in knowing whether 
statins are effective treatments for individuals with high blood cholesterol. It would be 
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patently inappropriate to include in a meta-analysis studies which tested the (mainly null) 
effects of statins in individuals with normal cholesterol levels. Yet this is precisely what 
Sundie et al.’s approach amounts to, yielding a theoretically-uninterpretable meta-analysis. 
This problem is illustrated by many other effects included in Sundie et al.’s meta-analysis but 
excluded from that of Shanks et al. Consider a study (Kim & Zauberman, 2013, Study 2) 
designed to test the hypothesis that “Sexual cues induce impatience through their ability to 
lengthen the perceived temporal distance to delayed rewards” (p. 328). These authors first 
showed participants either sexual or control photographs to rate, and then administered a 
time-perception task in which participants adjusted the length of a line on the computer 
display to represent a time interval (e.g., 6 months). In our meta-analysis we included the 
effect of priming condition on time perception. Kim and Zauberman also included a control 
task, described as follows: “to examine whether the effect of sexual cues is specific to 
judgment of future time or applies more generally, we measured participants’ perception of a 
line length” (p. 330) – in other words to check that the priming manipulation affected time 
perception per se rather than having a general effect on perceptual judgments. In this control 
task, which was not affected by the prime, participants judged the length of a line shown on 
the screen. Obviously, we did not include this control task in our meta-analysis. Yet Sundie 
et al. did. It is hard to see what possible logic might justify this inclusion. The outcome 
measure was not predicted by Kim and Zauberman to show a priming effect, nor was it a 
decision making measure. 
Hill and Durante (2011, Study 2) primed women with a mating-related or control task and 
then measured willingness to take risks to test 
“the hypothesis… that activating mating goals would lead to suppressed beliefs about 
the likelihood of incurring negative side-effects from the target health risk behaviors... 
Accordingly, participants filled out two types of measures for each of the target risk 
behaviors. First, they were asked to estimate the likelihood of experiencing negative 
health side-effects from the two attractiveness-enhancement risks — going tanning and 
using diet pills — and two control risks — using cough syrup as a sleep aid (an off-label 
use) and painting in a nonventilated room to avoid outside noise.” (p. 389). 
They observed a positive priming effect for tanning and diet pills but not for cough syrup or 
painting, “lending support for these effects being specific to risks associated with 
attractiveness enhancement” (p. 391). Again we excluded these control measures on the 
grounds that they are irrelevant to the focal question, as well as being predicted by the 
authors not to show a priming effect, while Sundie et al. included them. 
  Reply to Sundie et al. 
12 
 
It is not necessary to labor the point further. If one includes effects such as these (many of 
which were null effects) then it is hard to see how the outcome could be any different from 
what Sundie et al. obtained – a dilution of both the mean effect size and the funnel plot 
asymmetry, and an increase in heterogeneity. In sum, the logic for conducting an unselective 
meta-analysis is very hard to discern. Whatever the question is that such a meta-analysis 
addresses, it is not the question that Shanks et al. were concerned with: Whether the primary 
outcome measures reported in this literature, for which a priming effect was predicted, show 
evidence of publication bias/p-hacking. Put differently, if one is interested in testing for 
publication bias/p-hacking, then one has to focus on the dependent measures on which it is 
plausible to imagine these factors might have had an influence. 
The inappropriateness of the meta-analysis shown in their Figure 1 is clearly not lost on 
Sundie et al., because they acknowledge that their selection process is poorly suited to 
assessing publication bias and p-hacking. They say: “There are, however, problems with this 
approach to examining bias as well… even with all of the effects included in the funnel plot, it 
still does a poor job of representing the effects that would most likely be subject to 
publication bias, or the target of p-hacking… Consequently, examining a funnel plot that 
includes all of the simple and main effects from a set of studies designed to examine 
interactions is poorly suited to providing any definitive information about publication bias or 
p-hacking in a literature” (pp. 14-15). We could not agree more, but are left wondering how 
Sundie et al. intend the meta-analysis reported in their Figure 1 to clarify rather than confuse 
the discussion. 
Heterogeneity 
Sundie et al. argue that the effects of mating motives are heterogeneous and that the rules 
we followed for selecting effect sizes to include in our meta-analysis artificially reduced this 
true heterogeneity. When a much broader selection of effects is allowed in Sundie et al.’s 
meta-analysis, the degree of heterogeneity increases markedly and minimal evidence of 
funnel plot asymmetry is obtained. Thus the argument is that in reality the effects measured 
across these studies are highly diverse and they should not therefore be pooled in a meta-
analysis. 
Against this argument, it is important to emphasize that the heterogeneity observed in their 
larger meta-analysis (I2 = 58.9%) does not demonstrate that it is inappropriate to pool these 
effects. In fact this level of heterogeneity is in line with the average heterogeneity observed in 
meta-analyses generally, including in ones in which all contributing studies have highly 
similar designs and dependent measures. For example, recent analyses of published meta-
analyses by Rubio-Aparicio, Marín-Martínez, Sánchez-Meca, and López-López (2018) and 
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Stanley, Carter, and Doucouliagos (2018) found median I2 values of 60% and 74%, 
respectively. More directly pertinent, Table 1 lists a sample of recent meta-analyses of other 
priming effects. Like studies on romantic priming, these effects are investigated by 
measuring the effect of a prime (such as money or religious words) on a dependent 
measure, often in the decision making domain. The heterogeneity Sundie et al. observe in 
their larger meta-analysis is not at all out of line with the figures reported in these other meta-
analyses. So there is no evidence that this body of effects is any more heterogeneous than is 
typical in behavioural research generally or priming research specifically, or that it was 
inappropriate of us to aggregate them for meta-analysis. 
Moreover Sundie et al.’s conclusions regarding heterogeneity between their and our meta-
analyses are virtually pre-ordained. Their method of challenging a meta-analysis that reveals 
funnel-plot asymmetry and homogeneity of effect sizes (the one reported by Shanks et al.) is 
to merge it with a large set of additional effect sizes yielding a meta-analysis that (a) Sundie 
et al. themselves concede makes little conceptual sense, and which (b) shows little 
asymmetry and a considerable amount of heterogeneity. But this pattern obviously lends 
itself to a very different interpretation: Our selection process was more appropriate than 
Sundie et al.’s precisely because it yielded low heterogeneity. By mixing together primary 
and secondary outcome measures, the increase in heterogeneity that Sundie et al. obtained 
is entirely unsurprising. The fact that the effects we studied were homogeneous exactly 
supports our decision to select those effects. 
To make this point concrete, consider the following simulation. In this model we mix two sets 
of studies. In both sets the real effect size is d = 0 and all variation comes from sampling 
error (sampling random values from a central t-distribution with N-2 degrees of freedom). 
Therefore, in truth, there is absolutely no non-random heterogeneity across the studies nor 
any priming effect. Set 1, which represents the studies’ primary outcome measures, 
undergoes publication bias. For the sake of simplicity, this is modeled by running 1000 
experiments and retaining only the ones with significantly positive results (usually 2.5% of 
them in a two-tailed test)2. Set 2, which represents all the secondary outcome measures that 
Sundie et al. included in their meta-analysis, is completely unbiased: everything is published. 
This is modeled by just sampling 100 studies. Mixing both sets results in a combined dataset 
of about 125 studies where 100 are unbiased and 25 have been subject to publication bias. 
Each of these simulations yields a funnel plot like the one shown in Figure 2. 
Several noteworthy results emerge in this model. First, there is significant heterogeneity 
across studies. If we repeat this process 100 times, the mean I2 across simulations is 40.5% 
and the associated Q statistic is statistically significant in all iterations. This is interesting 
because, actually, there is no true heterogeneity in these datasets: They all come from a 
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population with a true d = 0 and with SD = 0 in the true effect. But mixing biased and 
unbiased studies induces a substantial amount of observed heterogeneity. Therefore, 
Sundie et al.’s finding that there is too much variability across effect sizes to run a 
meaningful meta-analysis is likely to be the result of mixing biased effect sizes from primary 
outcomes and unbiased effect sizes from secondary outcomes. This is also important for a 
second reason. The fact that heterogeneity is large in Sundie et al.’s meta-analysis might 
invite the reader to think that there must be some true effects. After all, if effects are different 
from each other it follows that not all of them can be null effects. But these simulations show 
that, if a subset of studies is biased, they can. Another interesting result is that Egger's 
regression test becomes less able to detect bias when the 100 unbiased studies are added. 
Across the 100 simulations, Egger's test is only significant 32% of the time. 
It could be argued that the fact that our simulation produces results similar to the ones 
obtained by Sundie et al. does not necessarily mean that this is the process that actually 
produced their data set. To put this hypothesis to the test, ideally, one would need a meta-
analytic model that could assume that the submitted data come from a population of effects 
where the true effect is close to zero but both heterogeneity and the average observed effect 
size have been inflated artificially by mixing (a) a set of studies affected by publication or 
reporting biases and (b) a set of unbiased studies. Fortunately, such models exist. For 
instance, the selection model devised by Vevea and Hedges (1995) includes the assumption 
that non-significant studies may have a lower (but nonzero) probability of being published 
and entered into a meta-analysis and can correct for the inflation of effect sizes and 
heterogeneity produced by this ‘selection’ process. 
When this model is applied to the set of effect sizes computed by Sundie et al. (summarized 
in their Figure 2), it returns an average effect size that is still significant, d = 0.12, 95% CI 
[0.04, 0.19], but only half the magnitude of the effect computed by an equivalent standard 
random-effects meta-analysis applied to the same data set, d = 0.24, 95% CI [0.18, 0.31]. 
Heterogeneity is also halved from τ2 = 0.08 to 0.04. And, most importantly, the likelihood 
ratio comparing the fit of these two models is significant, χ2(1) = 13.89, p < .001, confirming 
that the selection model, which assumes publication bias, fits the data better than an 
unadjusted model ignoring such a possibility3. 
In sum, Sundie et al.’s meta-analysis does not remotely challenge the claim that the primary 
outcome measures in the target studies manifest publication bias/p-hacking. Because 
publication bias/p-hacking would affect the primary but not secondary measures, it is a 
statistical necessity that when the unbiased secondary measures are added to a meta-
analysis, heterogeneity will increase and funnel-plot asymmetry will be diluted. This is both 
what Sundie et al.’s results and the model shown above reveal. In fact, far from indicating 
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that this literature is unbiased, the data set gathered by Sundie et al. shows exactly the 
opposite when analysed with a sufficiently powerful method. 
Sundie et al.’s p-curve analysis 
As an alternative to the Shanks et al. meta-analysis and their own one, Sundie et al. report a 
p-curve analysis (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). They state that – in contrast to our 
findings – their p-curve analysis “suggests a different, more positive conclusion with no 
evidence of p-hacking” (Abstract). In showing that the data included in this analysis has 
evidential value, this analysis implies that romantic priming is a true phenomenon. We make 
several observations about this analysis. 
First, Sundie et al.’s conclusions are strikingly at variance with a completely independent 
analysis with a similar method reported by Schimmack (2016) which they do not refer to. 
Schimmack’s results and conclusions are identical to those of Shanks et al. – namely that 
there is irregularity in the romantic priming literature. Secondly, this analysis highlights a self-
contradiction. Sundie et al. criticize our protocol for selecting studies to include in our meta-
analysis (see above), yet include in their p-curve analysis exactly the same set of 15 articles. 
Thirdly, we described previously Sundie et al.’s criticism of our method of selecting effect 
sizes to include in our meta-analysis (based on the researchers’ predictions). Ironically, this 
is exactly the selection rule required by p-curve: “Included p values must meet three criteria: 
(a) test the hypothesis of interest… the researcher’s stated hypothesis determines which p 
values can and cannot be included in p-curve” (Simonsohn et al., 2014, p. 540). Thus Sundie 
et al.’s own approach contradicts their assertion that it is inappropriate to pay heed to the 
original research article’s key experimental predictions. The mere fact that Sundie et al. used 
p-curve at all and that they followed Simonsohn et al.’s rules implicitly supports our decision 
to select only some contrasts. 
Fourthly, another outcome of the p-curve analysis is the strong evidence that the body of 
studies is woefully under-powered, not having significantly greater power than 33% (the 
actual estimate of power is 37%). Sundie et al. do not comment on what this says about the 
published romantic priming literature, which despite this lack of power yields almost 
exclusively significant results. 
In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that the actual average power must be even lower 
than 37%. By far the most delicate part of p-curve analysis is the selection of the crucial 
statistical contrast from each study. Simonsohn et al. (2014) provided detailed guidelines for 
the selection of p-values in different experimental designs. In general, the selection rules are 
straightforward for simple designs, such as those involving a correlation or comparing just 
two conditions. But as the complexity of designs and hypotheses grows, the chances of 
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selecting the wrong statistic increase substantially and, not surprisingly, the creators of p-
curve analysis have expressed concerns about recurrent failures to follow their guidelines in 
published studies (Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2017; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2017). Sundie et al. recognise explicitly that in some cases they did not follow these 
guidelines because the authors of the papers they assessed failed to report the appropriate 
contrasts. Furthermore, their disclosure table reveals that they included many omnibus tests 
in their analysis which, in the words of Nelson et al. (2017) “are almost never the right test to 
select in psychological research”. 
The consequences of this decision are not trivial. In Figure 3 we plot the (reciprocal) p-values 
of each of the contrasts in the main analysis of Sundie et al. As can be seen, some of the 
smallest p-values come from contrasts that are easily identifiable as omnibus tests, because 
they refer to F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator. In fact, the 
smallest effect size, an order of magnitude lower than the next smallest p-value, comes from 
one such contrast. (Note that Figure 3 plots reciprocal p-values on a logarithmic scale.) 
Given that p-curve analysis (particularly the continuous test) is highly sensitive to outliers, 
including or excluding these p-values in the analysis makes a substantial difference4. Once 
all the omnibus tests in Figure 3 are removed from the analyses, the evidential value of 
studies fails to reach statistical significance in a binomial test, p = .076, and in the half p-
curve, z = -0.60, p = .275, although it remains significant in the continuous test, z = -2.21, p = 
.014. More importantly, the average estimated power after correcting for publication bias falls 
to 22% with 95% CI [7%, 42%], which again leads us to wonder how so many studies could 
yield significant support for their main hypotheses given their puzzlingly low statistical power. 
Perhaps more interestingly, the selection of contrasts made by Sundie et al. for their p-curve 
analysis provides yet another opportunity to test for publication and reporting bias in this 
literature with a data set that we did not select and that, consequently, cannot possibly be 
influenced by our “agenda” (Sundie et al., p. 3). We converted each of the contrasts selected 
for the main p-curve analysis to a correlation per degree of freedom, following the same set 
of equations and code used in the Supplementary Material of Open Science Collaboration 
(2015) to compare effect sizes and test for funnel plot asymmetry. Of note, this method also 
excludes data from F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator, in this 
case because their standard errors cannot be computed. There is no reason why these 
effect sizes, coming from the analysis of disparate effects, should follow any particular 
distribution and, definitely, it makes no sense to wonder what the average effect size of these 
tests is. Yet when one plots these effect sizes against their standard errors (see Figure 4) an 
all too familiar shape arises, which, we think, speaks for itself. 
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Whatever the merits of these various arguments about study selection, the key point is that 
all of the proposed datasets reveal evidence of irregularity. Added to the original Shanks et 
al. (2015) dataset, we now have the larger set that Sundie et al. aggregated (144 effect 
sizes, plotted in their Figure 1), plus the dataset they deemed suitable for p-curve (their 
Figure 2), and our version of this dataset that excludes 6 effects derived from omnibus tests. 
As Table 2 summarises, there is evidence of publication bias and/or p-hacking in all of them, 
across a range of convergent analytic techniques. 
Shanks et al.’s replication studies 
The second half of Sundie et al.’s Comment argues that a series of flaws in our 8 replication 
studies render them largely uninformative about the original effects they sought to examine.  
We acknowledge at the outset that replication experiments, like all experiments, are rarely 
perfect and would almost invariably, with the benefit of hindsight, be conducted differently 
and better. The contextual factors discussed above, such as sexual orientation and age, are 
good examples. Data collection is rarely unconstrained by resources. But how fair is it to 
claim, as Sundie et al. do, that “each Shanks et al. replication study contained multiple 
methodological deviations from the parallel original study” (p. 24)? To give just one 
counterexample, Study 7 replicated Greitmeyer et al.’s (2013) experiments on sexual risk-
taking and gambling nearly exactly and indeed did so with considerably larger sample sizes, 
by a factor of about 3. Whereas Greitmeyer et al. obtained effect sizes of around 0.8, our 
replication estimates were zero. Sundie et al. make no mention of these striking replication 
failures. They also (p. 22) criticize our use of predominantly online samples, yet Study 7a 
included more participants tested in laboratory cubicles than Greitemeyer et al. themselves 
tested and had substantial statistical power even in this sub-sample to detect the effect 
Greitemeyer et al. obtained – and again, analysing data from just these participants reveals 
no change in the outcome. 
We explicitly acknowledged differences between our studies and the originals (indeed 
including a Table listing the main differences), and presented considerable information (such 
as Bayesian analyses) relevant to judging the adequacy of our sample sizes. One of our 
studies was fully pre-registered, to date one of only two such studies in the entire romantic 
priming literature (the other is by Chiou, Wu, & Cheng, 2017), and had a sample size of 650, 
far larger than any other study in the field. Whatever flaws individual experiments may have 
had, the sheer weight of evidence across our studies makes it highly unlikely that all our 
results are false negatives. 
Manipulation checks 
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Sundie et al. (pp. 23-24) make the perfectly valid point that manipulation checks are 
important for ensuring that a replication study is successfully manipulating the key variables 
in the selected participant sample. As they acknowledge, we reported data from one 
particularly important check which obtained a satisfactory medium-sized effect. Nonetheless, 
Sundie et al. criticize us for not doing more to pre-test our priming manipulations and 
dependent measures to confirm, for example, that items assumed to represent conspicuous 
consumer items were indeed judged as such by our participants. 
Although it is hard to imagine that items like a car or holiday, taken from the original studies, 
could be viewed otherwise, a key point to emphasize is that most of the studies included in 
the meta-analysis reported no pre-testing of their manipulations or dependent measures 
whatsoever. We showed that primes increased desire for a romantic partner, but the majority 
of studies in the meta-analysis included no such checks. 
By comparing the effect of our priming manipulation against one of their own checks 
(Griskevicius et al., 2006), Sundie et al. imply (p. 19) that ours may have been too weak to 
be an effective prime. This is an erroneous conclusion based on an elementary confusion. 
They cite a check (Griskevicius et al., 2006) from a study not included in the meta-analysis 
which obtained a very large effect size (d > 7) of a prime. Our own effect was much smaller 
(d = 0.41). But the dependent measure in the Griskevicius et al. study was different from that 
used in our experiment: They measured sexual arousal whereas we measured desire for a 
romantic partner. These are completely different dependent variables. Someone can feel 
sexually aroused as a result of looking at pictures of attractive individuals without any 
change in her/his desire for a romantic partner. Sundie et al.’s confusion is akin to the 
following scenario: Imagine two employees X and Y are given pay increases of unknown 
amounts. X’s subjective life satisfaction improves by 0.01% whereas Y’s bank balance 
increases by 50%. Therefore Y received a larger pay increase than X. 
None of the studies in the meta-analysis estimated an effect size for the manipulation we 
tested, but if they had, what would they have found? Does the Griskevicius et al. estimate or 
our estimate give a better guide? There is simply no way of knowing, and crucially it cannot 
be inferred that our effect was weaker. Put differently, there is no reason to think that if we 
had used sexual arousal as our dependent measure we would have obtained a weaker effect 
than Griskevicius et al. did. Sundie et al.’s argument about the strength of our manipulation is 
fallacious and rests on comparing apples and oranges. 
Conclusion 
Sundie et al. claim that we misapplied the selection method we adopted (namely to base our 
inclusion rule on the original authors’ predictions). We have argued, instead, that almost 
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anyone following our rule would have made the same selections that we did, and our 
decisions about which effects to include in our meta-analysis, based on experimenters’ 
predictions, were appropriate. We regard it as illogical to conduct a meta-analysis which 
includes all effects from the studies in question. We have suggested that the new meta-
analysis reported by Sundie et al. is both conceptually uninterpretable and also fails to 
demonstrate anything new or unexpected. It is uninterpretable because it includes effects 
(such as the results of a control condition measuring a dependent variable unconnected with 
decision making and showing, as the authors expected, a null result) that have no bearing on 
the original authors’ predictions. Its results are unsurprising because even if it is the case (as 
Shanks et al. claimed) that the primary outcome measures from the target articles reveal 
evidence of publication bias/p-hacking, one would expect to see the overall effect size as 
well as the funnel plot asymmetry become diluted and heterogeneity increased with the 
inclusion of secondary effects much less likely to have been affected by publication bias/p-
hacking. This is exactly the outcome Sundie et al. obtained and is perfectly consistent with 
Shanks et al.’s conclusion. 
Sundie et al.’s p-curve analysis highlights the internal contradictions in their approach and 
serves, if anything, to strengthen our conclusion that publication bias and/or p-hacking may 
be a genuine problem in this field of research. Despite condemning our study selection 
protocol, Sundie et al. include exactly the same set of studies in their p-curve analysis. 
Despite condemning our method for selecting effects from within these studies – based on 
the experimenters’ key predictions – they employ exactly the same method in selecting 
effects to include. And contrary to their claim that the analysis reveals no evidence of 
publication bias and/or p-hacking, Figure 4 shows the exact opposite: A striking and highly 
significant correlation between effect size and sample size in the very sub-set of data Sundie 
et al. thought it reasonable and appropriate to include in their analysis. 
Regarding the second main part of the Comment, the points raised (i) are mostly pure 
speculations, (ii) were acknowledged at length by Shanks et al., (iii) and have minimal 
empirical support (e.g., the results do not change if sub-groups are selected based on age). 
If Sundie et al. are confident that mating motives can prime decision-making measures, one 
might wonder whether debate about our meta-analysis and empirical results is the best way 
for the field to proceed. Better would be to conduct new and preferably pre-registered studies 
employing all the instructions, manipulation checks and so on that Sundie et al. and other 
evolutionary psychologists working in this field regard as critical to obtaining the key priming 
effects. Indeed a successful study of exactly this sort has recently been published (Chiou et 
al., 2017). Better still would be a multi-lab registered replication project.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. Though note that the experiment was sensitive to loss aversion which across both groups 
and genders is significantly negative, loss aversion score = -10.3, 95% CI [-17.7, -2.9]. 
 
2. We are not implying that bias in this literature is entirely due to selective publication and 
that only 2.5% of the studies ever conducted are published. Questionable research practices 
can yield similar levels of bias more “efficiently”, that is, without condemning most studies to 
the file drawer (e.g., Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, & Dougherty, 2014). 
 
3. This analysis does not take into account the fact that some of these effects were 
statistically dependent. We are not aware of any selection model that explicitly addresses 
this issue. 
 
4. It is worth briefly expanding on the pattern of results which yielded the contrast with the 
smallest p value in Sundie et al.’s dataset. This comes from an experiment (Greitemeyer et 
al., 2013, Experiment 3) which yielded a 2-way interaction [F(2, 111) = 12.31] between 
participant gender and condition (short-term prime vs. long-term prime vs. control). The basis 
of this interaction was an overall priming effect in male participants (Cohen’s d = 1.65, 
combining the short- and long-term prime conditions, which did not differ). Females showed 
no priming effect. However Shanks et al.’s Experiment 5 failed to replicate this effect in 
males, despite having very high power (1 – β = 1.00) to detect an effect of the magnitude 
observed by Greitemeyer et al. and high power to detect an effect of half the size (power = 
0.97). There is therefore a major question mark over Greitemeyer et al.’s result and by 
extension over any dataset which includes it. 
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Table 1 
Measures of heterogeneity (Q and I2) in the Shanks et al. (2015) meta-analysis of romantic 
priming and published meta-analyses of related priming effects. 
 
Study Domain Q df p I2 
Meta-analyses of published literature 
Shanks et al. (2015) Romantic priming 53.7 42 .11 19.6% 
Billingsley et al. (2018) Religious priming 43.4 8 < .001 88.5% 
Lodder et al. (in press) Money priming 1048.7 245 < .001 81.3% 
Shariff et al. (2016) Religious priming 195.2 91 < .001 53.4% 
Weingarten et al. (2016) Action priming 934.8 351 < .001 62.5% 
Vadillo et al. (2016) Money priming 441.7 99 < .001 81.5% 
Meta-analyses of multi-lab replication studies 
Ebersole et al. (2016) 
Metaphoric restructuring 21.9 19 .29 18.2% 
Warmth perceptions 16.9 20 .66 0.0% 
Klein et al. (2014) 
Money priming 28.4 35 .78 0.0% 
Flag priming 30.3 35 .69 0.0% 
Klein et al. (in press) 
Consumption priming 63.8 53 .15 12.0% 
Warmth priming 73.0 46 .01 37.0% 
O’Donnell et al. (2018) Intelligence priming 28.1 22 .17 17.4% 
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Table 2 
Datasets of romantic priming effects and relevant evidence of publication bias/p-hacking in each. 
 
Source Dataset No. of articles No. of effects 
Evidence of 
publication 
bias/p-hacking? 
Support 
Shanks et al. 
(2015) 
Figure 2 15 43 Yes 
Funnel plot asymmetry, Egger’s test, t(41) = 6.24, 
p < .0001 
Sundie et al. 
(in press) 
Meta-analysis 
(Figure 1) 
15 144 Yes 
Vevea and Hedges (1995) selection model fits 
better than random-effects meta-analysis, χ2(1) = 
13.89, p < .001 
p-curve 
(Figure 2) 
15 32 Yes Power = 37% 
Omnibus tests 
removed 
15 26 Yes 
(i) Power = 22% 
(ii) Nonsignificant right skew, pHalf = .275 
(iii) Funnel plot asymmetry, Egger’s test, t(23) = 
6.48, p < .0001 (Figure 4) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1 
Scatterplot of loss aversion scores as a function of age for male (left panel) and female (right 
panel) participants in the prime and control groups of Shanks et al.’s (2015) Experiment 8. If 
romantic primes make males but not females less averse to losses and do so in an age-
dependent manner then the best-fitting regression lines in the left but not right panel should 
be more widely separated (scores lower in the control [red dotted line] than in the prime [blue 
dotted line] group) in young than older participants. This is clearly not the case, with the lines 
virtually superimposed (no priming) across the age range for both male and female 
participants. See the online article for the color version of this figure. 
Figure 2 
Funnel plot based on the model described in the text. Each dot depicts the effect size 
(Cohen’s d) of a simulated study plotted against the inverse of that study’s SE. The studies 
come from two sets, a biased one (red dots) and an unbiased one (green dots). In both sets 
the real effect size is d = 0 but publication bias is applied to the biased set such that only 
statistically significant effects are included. See the online article for the color version of this 
figure. 
Figure 3 
Reciprocal p values (log scale) for all effects included by Sundie et al. in their p-curve 
analysis. Red bars depict omnibus tests (F-tests with more than one degree of freedom in the 
numerator), green bars depict the remaining tests. 
Figure 4 
Funnel plot of the data selected by Sundie et al. (in press) for their p-curve analysis, omitting 
results from omnibus tests. Each dot depicts effect size (Fisher’s z-transformed correlation) 
against the inverse SE. See the online article for the color version of this figure. 
 
